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NOTE FOR DD/NFA:

I wish that critiques of analysis would just once be prepared by someone who had actually done some intelligence analysis himself. This is a lousy paper. It opens with an extended discussion of how bad things are which is a mishmash of misinformation, exaggeration, and the occasional bit of truth. We did, after all, blow it on Iran. But all this conveys the impression that our analysis is a disaster area and I do not believe this to be true. [] prescription for improving things can be found on Pages 23 and 24 and consists of a list of rhetorical questions: Why can't CIA do []? The only trouble is that we are in fact doing all these things. Beyond that, his suggestions are the usual pie-in-the-sky -- the consumer must change his attitude, intelligence must reopen relations with the American people, etc. You are quoted to this effect on Page 26. He does, I am happy to say, continue to support the Agency role as the coordinator of estimates, but he would like to see us protected from the corrupting touch of our clandestine brethren. I do not understand how a man like [] can maintain the reputation that he has; he has the access that would enable him at least to know the present situation. This is really an awful paper.

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